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Abstract
In Briata, Dall’Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), the authors introduce a coopera-
tive game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among
completely risk-averse agents involved in the fair division procedure introduced
by Knaster (1946). In this paper we analyze the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)
of the game and propose its use as a measure of the players’ attitude towards
collusion. Furthermore, we relate the sign of the Shapley value with the ranking
order of the players’ evaluation, and show that some players in a given ranking
will always deter collusion. Finally, we characterize the coalitions that maximize
the gain from collusion, and suggest an ad-hoc coalition formation mechanism.
Keywords: Shapley value, Knaster procedure, collusion.
1 Introduction
The collusion is a secret and fraudulent agreement among two or more agents for an
illicit purpose, at damage of other ones. Auctions and sports are also not immune
from collusion. For example, auctions with low minimum prices are vulnerable to
collusion among bidders. Graham and Marshall (1985) study the optimal minimum
price set by a seller, while Mead (1967) and Milgrom (1987) prove that ascending-
bid auction is more susceptible to collusion than sealed-bid auction. The possible
agreements of agents in an auction and the consequent allocation of gains is considered
by Branzei et al. (2009) and Fragnelli and Meca (2010). To avoid that judges of artistic
sports collude, Federations adopt various strategies in the regulations (Gambarelli et
al., 2012). We recall that the collusive behavior is illegal. For instance, the Italian
Civil Code punishes the suspected or supposed colluders.
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Fair division procedures are certainly not immune from collusion. In what follows
we focus our attention on the role that collusion plays into one of the earliest pro-
cedures proposed by one of the founders of the field. The Knaster procedure (1946)
allocates indivisible objects with monetary compensations in order to restore fairness:
each indivisible item is first exchanged for a money amount equal to the highest val-
uation of it, then the monetary quantity is shared among all the agents according to
their valuations. Knaster procedure is efficient (there is no other distribution that
yields every agent a higher payoff), and proportional (each of the n agents thinks to
receive at least one n-th of the total value), if the agents report their true valuations
(Brams and Taylor, 1996 and 1999). When an agent misreports her/his valuation in-
dividually, Knaster procedure is manipulable, incurring the risk of a loss in her/his
final payoff; on the other hand, Knaster procedure with infinitely risk-averse agents
is non-manipulable, since there is no way of obtaining a safe gain (Fragnelli and Ma-
rina, 2009). Nevertheless, if two or more agents (but not all) collude, coordinating
their false declarations, Knaster procedure proves to be coalition-manipulable, where
a mechanism is said coalition-strategy-proof when ”if a joint misreport by a coalition
strictly benefits one member of the coalition, it must strictly hurt at least one other
member” (Moulin, 1993). Fragnelli and Marina (2009) remark that the gain produced
by the collusion is always non-negative, but enlarging the set of colluders the gain may
increase or decrease. Briata, Dall’Aglio and Fragnelli (2012) propose a dynamic allo-
cation mechanism according to which the enlargement of the set of colluders is always
non-disadvantageous, since the previous gain of the incumbent colluders is guaranteed
by their altered declarations, so they secure themselves against the entrant colluders.
In the same work, a cooperative game with transferable utility is introduced: For each
coalition of agents this game, called the gain game, measures the gain that those agents
obtain by colluding with each other at the expenses of the agents outside the coaliton.
In the present work we devote our attention to the Shapley value of the gain game.
We provide a computationally fast explicit formula for the Shapley value in terms
of the valutations’ differences, and we propose an interpretation of this value as an
indicator of the agents’ attitiude towards collusion: Agents are prone (neutral, averse,
resp.) to collusion if their Shapley value is positive (null, negative, resp.), with the
absolute value of the Shapley value measuring the intensity of such attitude. We
will show that the attitude is strongly conditioned by the ranking position of the
agent’s valuation. In particular, for any specification of the agents’ valuations, one or
two players with intermediate position in the ranking will constantly be harmed by
collusion (and will therefore deter it), and the Shapley value measured as a function
of the ranked agents will exhibit a “V” shape. Since collusion occurs by a coalition
at the expense of outside agents, the grand coalition will never form. We will show
that the coalitions that maximize the gain (either the coalition worth or the per-capita
value) are those formed by the agent with highest valuation, together with a number
of agents with lowest valuation. This suggests a coalition formation mechanism for the
situation where agents know the collective ranking, but not the individual valuations
of the other agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we recall the basic definitions
of game theory, the Knaster procedure, the concept of collusion and the definition of
gain game; in Section 3, we develop the closed form formula for the Shapley value;
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Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the players’ attitude towards collusion; in Section
5, we characterize the coalitions that provide maximal gain; Section 6 concludes.
2 Notation and Basic Definitions
In this section, we provide the basic notion of cooperative game theory and a short
outline of the Knaster procedure.
2.1 Elements of Game Theory
A Transferable Utility game or TU-game in characteristic function form is a pair (N, v),
where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of players and v : 2N → R is a real function, with
v(∅) = 0, called characteristic function. A subset S ⊆ N is called coalition and N is
called grand coalition. v(S), S ⊆ N , is the worth of S, i.e. the joint utility that the
players in S may obtain independently from the other players. A TU-game (N, v) is
inessential, if v(N) =
∑
i∈N v({i}). Given a TU-game (N, v), an allocation is a vector
(xi)i∈N ∈ Rn; an imputation is an allocation such that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) (efficiency)
and xi ≥ v({i}) for each i ∈ N (individual rationality); an allocation rule is a function
ψ : (N, v)→ Rn which assigns an allocation ψ(v) to every TU-game (N, v) in the class
of games with player set N . One of the most usual rules is the Shapley value (Shapley,
1953), φ, given by:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)), i ∈ N, (1)
where s = |S|, the cardinality of S. An alternative equivalent formula for the Shapley
value (see Hart, 1989) is
φi(v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π
[v(P pii ∪ {i})− v(P pii )] ,
where Π is the set of all the permutations of the elements of N and P pii is the set of
players in N which precede i in the order pi. In words, the Shapley value of a player is
her/his expected marginal contribution to a random coalition.
2.2 Knaster procedure for one object
Applying the Knaster procedure, we suppose that the value of each object obtained
by an agent is independent from who has obtained the other objects (additivity), so
the problem of allocating a set of objects simply corresponds to treating each object
independently (private communication by Fink to Brams, mentioned in Brams and
Taylor, 1996); this enables us to consider only a single object.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents, which we assume to be completely risk-
averse, to have the same valuation of monetary quantities, and to have equal rights
on the object. We suppose that agent i ∈ N knows only her/his own valuation vi of
the item and does not use any statistical information on the valuations of the others.
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We assume also that agents are not subject to any liquidity or budget constraints.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the agents are ordered according to weakly
decreasing valuations, i.e. v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Once the valuations are communicated
to a mediator, agent 1 gets the object for the price v1. Notice that even in the case
of multiple maximal valuations, the transaction will involve only one agent, labelled
agent 1. Exchanging the indivisible item for money makes the division possible. Each
agent i ∈ N receives the expected initial fair share Ei = 1nvi, plus an equal share of the
surplus S = v1− 1n
∑
j∈N vj. The surplus is non-negative (Brams and Taylor, 1996); in
particular it is zero if and only if all the valuations are exactly the same (Kuhn, 1967).
The adjusted fair share or payoff of agent i ∈ N is Vi = Ei + Sn = vin + v1n − 1n2
∑
j∈N vj.
In the resulting allocation, the sum of the compensations in money c1 =
1−n
n
v1+
S
n
=
V1 − v1 and ci = vin + Sn = Vi, for i ∈ N \ {1} is zero, so Knaster procedure does not
require or produce money (Brams and Taylor, 1996). The solution is proportional since
it secures to agent i ∈ N a portion Vi ≥ 1nvi. Knaster procedure with more than two
agents does not guarantee envy-freeness, as an agent may prefer another’s portion to
her/his own. For instance, agent k envies agent j, with 1 < j < k ≤ n, when vk < vj,
as in this case ck < cj.
2.3 Collusive behavior and gain game
From Fragnelli and Marina (2009), we know that agent 1 may increase her/his payoff
declaring v1 − ε, with 0 < ε < v1 − v2, while agent k ∈ N \ {1} may increase her/his
payoff declaring vk + ε, with 0 < ε < v1 − vk, assuming, in both cases, that the other
agents maintain their valuations. In particular, suppose that agent k ∈ N \{1} declares
vk + ε, with 0 < ε < v1 − vk, the consequences are:
1. agent 1 still has the highest declaration, gets the object, pays n−1
n
v1, receives
1
n
(
v1 − 1n
∑
j∈N vj − 1n(vj − vk)
)
and her/his payoff decreases by 1
n2
(vj − vk);
2. the final amount for agent k is 1
n
vk +
1
n
(vj − vk) + 1nv1− 1n2
∑
j∈N vj − 1n2 (vj − vk),
so the variation of the payoff is n−1
n2
(vj − vk);
3. each agent i ∈ N \ {1, k} receives 1
n
vi +
1
n
(
v1 − 1n
∑
j∈N vj − 1n(vj − vk)
)
and
her/his payoff decreases by 1
n2
(vj − vk).
Since agent k does not know the other agents’ valuations, the altered
declaration may exceed that of agent 1. In such case, agent k would get
the object at an excessive price and would ultimately lower her/his payoff.
Assuming complete risk aversion, this agent would better declare a truthful
bid.
Similarly, if agent 1 bids a value lower than the true valuation, s/he may
incur the risk of losing the object, thus reducing her/his payoff. We refer to
Fragnelli and Marina (2009) for the details.
Conversely, agents engaging in a collusive behavior may alter their bids to enjoy a
safe gain in the payoffs. We start with the following definition.
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Definition 2.1 (see Definition 1 in Fragnelli and Marina (2009)). A collusion of a
coalition of completely risk-averse agents consists of:
1. truthful revelation among them of their valuations;
2. same declaration of the highest true valuation;
3. binding agreement on the gain sharing.
Generalizing to any number of agents Propositions 1 and 2 in Fragnelli and Marina
(2009),we get the following result.
Proposition 2.2. The highest safe gain of a set of agents S ⊆ N of completely risk-
averse agents is obtained when they truthfully reveal their valuations to the other col-
luders and all of them declare the same value bS where
bS := max
i∈S
vi .
The corresponding joint gain of the set of agents S is
vg(S) =
n− s
n2
∑
i∈S
(bS − vi) .
Proof. If agent i ∈ S declares vi her/his payoff is Vi = vin + v1n − 1n2
∑
j∈N vj; if s/he
declares bS her/his payoff is V ′i =
bS
n
+ v1
n
− 1
n2
∑
j∈N\S vj + s
bS
n
, where s = |S|.
Consequently, the gain from altering the bid is V ′i − Vi = b
S−vi
n
− 1
n2
∑
j∈S(b
S − vj).
The joint gain of coalition S is
vg(S) =
∑
i∈S(V
′
i − Vi) =
∑
i∈S
(
bS−vi
n
− 1
n2
∑
j∈S(b
S − vj)
)
=
∑
i∈S
bS−vi
n
− s
n2
∑
j∈S(b
S − vj)
=
n− s
n2
∑
i∈S(b
S − vi) .
The maximality of the joint gain follows from the complete risk-aversion of the agents,
because with a declaration larger than bS, they may incur the risk of getting the object,
paying it more than the highest real valuation.
In other words, the collusion starts with a truthful revelation among the colluding
agents of their valuations, then all of them declare the highest true valuation and a
binding agreement guarantees their safe gain and its sharing. Clearly vg(S) ≥ 0 for
every S ⊆ N .
Remark 2.3. Since the procedure does not require or produces money, the gain of the
colluders is obtained at expenses of the other agents.
Interpreting vg as a characteristic function, we obtain the gain game (N, vg). We
remark that the gain game introduced in Proposition 2.2 is inspired by the collusion
game defined in Briata, Dall’Aglio and Fragnelli (2012); the main difference is that a
collusion game may be defined with each group of colluders as player set, while the
player set of the gain game is the grand coalition.
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Furthermore, vg({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N and vg(N) = 0, so the game is inessential.
Consequently, the non-null game has no monotonicity property, either in absolute or
in relative value, and the contribution of a player to a coalition can be positive, null
or negative. In this situation the Shapley value is not an imputation and cannot be
interpreted as the optimal division of the grand coalition payoff, since such coalition
will not form. We will rather resort to the alternative interpretation of the Shapley
value of a player as her/his expected marginal contribution to a random coalition;
Consequently, it may be viewed as an index of the colluding power of each agent.
Recalling the efficiency of the Shapley value,
∑
i∈N φi(vg) = vg(N) = 0, we can classify
players into three classes, depending on the sign of the corresponding Shapley value:
Those favoring collusion (positive value), those neutral w.r.t. it (null value), and those
inhibiting it (negative value). The absolute value of the Shapley value will then measure
the intensity of such attitude. Note that the matter of being favorable, neutral or
adverse towards collusion has no ethical meaning; it simply refers to the expected gain
after collusion. For instance, they may be less or more interested in implementing
mechanisms that aim to make collusions more difficult. A theoretical application is an
ex-ante analysis of the profitability for an agent to participate in a colluding group,
supposing we know the ex-post valuations, like an impartial external observer with
complete information.
3 Computing the Shapley Value
In this section, we present the results that allow for a quantitative analysis of the
Shapley value for the gain game defined in the previous section. Our main result gives
an explicit expression for the Shapley value of the gain game as linear combination of
the differences between players that are adjacent in the ranking.
Theorem 3.1. For each agent i ∈ N ,
φi(vg) =
n−1∑
j=1
ψij(vj − vj+1) , (2)
where, for each j ∈ N \ {n}
ψij =
{
(n− j) c(n, j) if i ≤ j
−j c(n, j) if i > j (3)
and c(n, j) =
2n− 3j − j2
2n(j + 1)(j + 2)
.
Proof. See the Appendix
Let us denote by v = (vj − vj+1)Tj∈N\{n} the vector of differences between the
evaluations of adjacent players, and by Ψ, the n×(n−1) matrix of the linear coefficients
for the Shapley value. According to Theorem 3.1, the Shapley value can be expressed
in matricial notation as
φ(vg) = Ψ · v , (4)
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with φ(vg) = (φ1(vg), . . . , φn(vg))
T . Moreover, the j-th column in Ψ has null sum, and
its first j elements are all equal to each other, and so are its last n− j elements, with
a gap between the two groups of coefficient given by
ψjj − ψj+1,j = c(n, j) . (5)
Example 3.2. Consider a situation with 5 agents whose evaluations of the object are
10, 6, 3, 2, 1, respectively. The values of the differences according to (5) are:
ψ11 − ψ21 = 0.1;ψ22 − ψ32 = 0.00;ψ33 − ψ43 = −0.04;ψ44 − ψ54 = −0.06
By (3), we can compute the matrix of coefficients:
Ψ =

0.080 0.000 −0.016 −0.012
−0.020 0.000 −0.016 −0.012
−0.020 0.000 −0.016 −0.012
−0.020 0.000 0.024 −0.012
−0.020 0.000 0.024 0.048
 .
The vector of the differences of the evaluations is v = (4, 3, 1, 1)T , and the Shapley
value is φ(vg) = Ψ · v = (0.292,−0.108,−0.108,−0.068,−0.008)T .
Note that if the evaluations of the object were 10, 9, 8, 4, 1, respectively, the matrix
Ψ would be the same, while v = (1, 1, 4, 3)T and the Shapley value would be φ(vg) =
(−0.020,−0.120,−0.120, 0.040, 0.220)T , i.e. the signs for players 1, 4, 5 would change,
while players 2 and 3 would again be negative.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 makes use of the following combinatorial result which we
believe is of autonomous beauty and importance.
Lemma 3.3. For every j, t ∈ N,
t∑
s=1
(
t
s
)(
j+t
s
) = t
j + 1
; (6)
t∑
s=1
s
(
t
s
)(
j+t
s
) = t (j + t+ 1)
(j + 1)(j + 2)
. (7)
Proof. Let us start by proving (6) by induction on t. It is trivially true for t = 1.
Assume now it is true for t, let us show that it is true for t+ 1. Indeed
t+1∑
s=1
(
t+1
s
)(
j+t+1
s
) = t+1∑
s=1
t+1
s
(
t
s−1
)
j+t+1
s
(
j+t
s−1
) = t+ 1
j + t+ 1
t+1∑
s=1
(
t
s−1
)(
j+t
s−1
) =
=
t+ 1
j + t+ 1
t∑
s=0
(
t
s
)(
j+t
s
) = t+ 1
j + t+ 1
[
1 +
t
j + 1
]
=
t+ 1
j + 1
,
by the induction hypothesis. This is precisely (6) with t+ 1 replacing t.
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We now prove (7), again by induction on t. Since the formula is trivial for t = 1,
let us assume it holds for t. Then, reasoning as above,
t+1∑
s=1
s
(
t+1
s
)(
j+t+1
s
) = t+ 1
j + t+ 1
t∑
s=0
(s+ 1)
(
t
s
)(
j+t
s
) = t+ 1
t+ j + 1
[
1 +
t∑
s=1
s
(
t
s
)(
j+t
s
) + t∑
s=1
(
t
s
)(
j+t
s
)] ,
which, using (6) and the induction hypothesis, gives
t+1∑
s=1
s
(
t+1
s
)(
j+t+1
s
) = t+ 1
t+ j + 1
[
1 +
t (j + t+ 1)
(j + 1)(j + 2)
+
t
j + 1
]
=
(t+ 1) (j + t+ 2)
(j + 1)(j + 2)
.
This completes the proof of the Lemma.
We end this section showing that the computational burden for evaluating the
Shapley value is polynomial in the number of agents.
Corollary 3.4. The Shapley value is computed in O(n2) time
Proof. The matrix Ψ requires the computation of the gaps (5) i.e. n−1 steps; then it is
necessary to compute two values for each column corresponding to the closed formula
(3), i.e. 2(n− 1) steps; and finally, the scalar product Ψ · v requires O(n2) operations.
Thus the overall computational complexity is O(n2).
4 Constant Attitude towards Collusion
We will now investigate the presence of agents with constant attitude toward collusion.
According to Theorem 3.1, the Shapley value depends primarily on the ranking position
of the agent evaluation. We will now show that players in the extreme positions in
the ranking play a prominent role in the colluding process when compared to the
intermediate ones. Moreover, in any instance of the game, one or two “central” players
will constantly inhibit collusion and their behavior will depend only on the ranking of
their evaluation, not on their absolute value.
Example 3.2 (Continued). For any determination of the evaluations, the Shapley
value for players 2 and 3 will be non-positive and identical, since they are given by the
scalar product of corresponding identical non-positive rows in the matrix Ψ with the
non-negative vector v. It is easy to verify that each time we move up or down from
rows 2 and 3, a negative coefficient of the row turns positive, implying an increase in
the Shapley value of the corresponding player.
We now investigate the presence of players whose attitude towards collusion is
determined exclusively by the ranking position of the corresponding evaluation.
Definition 4.1. Player i is
• Strongly (Weakly) collusion prone w.r.t. any specification of the evaluations com-
patible with the given ranking if ψij > 0 (ψij ≥ 0) for every j ∈ N \ {n};
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• Strongly (Weakly) collusion averse w.r.t. any specification of the evaluations com-
patible with the given ranking if ψij < 0 (ψij ≤ 0) for every j ∈ N \ {n}.
Example 3.2 showed that in the case of n = 5 agents, agents 2 and 3 are weakly
collusion averse, and their common Shapley value is a global minimum for φj(vg) in the
variable j, since in the other rows of Ψ one or more negative coefficients turn positive.
Also, there is no collusion prone player in the same situation.
A thorough examination of similar situations involving small number of agents,
reveals the constant presence of collusion averse players (weakly or strongly).
Example 4.2. If we denote with a “ +”, “ 0” or a “ −”, respectively, a positive, null
or negative coefficient in Ψ for the cases with n = 2 players through n = 6 players, we
find the following evidence
[
1 0
2 0
]  + −2 − −
− +


+ − −
2 − − −
− + −
− + +

n = 2 n = 3 n = 4

+ 0 − −
2 − 0 − −
3 − 0 − −
− 0 + −
− 0 + +


+ + − − −
− + − − −
3 − − − − −
− − + − −
− − + + −
− − + + +

n = 5 n = 6
.
When n = 2, both players are simultaneously weakly averse and weakly prone (actually
the Shapley value for both is always null). Starting from n = 3 there never exists a
collusion prone agent, while there exists at least a collusion averse one. In the case
n = 5 there are two weakly averse players (as already seen in Example 3.2), while there
is a single strongly collusion averse one in all the other cases. In any case, the Shapley
value reaches a minimum at the collusion averse player(s).
The alternation between one strongly averse player and two weakly averse ones is
confirmed by the computation of the coefficients’ signs up to n = 15 players in Table
1. Note that the gap between the cases with two weakly averse players always increases
by one, and these occurrences mark a change in position of the strongly averse player
in all the other occurences (i.e. the gaps between these occurrences), so that the averse
players form a “ladder” pattern in the table.
According to the pattern in Table 1, two weakly averse players are present when
n2 = 2, when n3 = 2 + 3 = 5 and, in general, when, for some k ≥ 2,
nk =
k∑
j=2
j =
k2 + k − 2
2
. (8)
The general pattern is confirmed by the following theorem.
9
Table 1: The pattern of doomed players: strongly (weakly, resp.) doomed players are
indicated by ⊗ (, resp.)
Pl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
2  
3 · ⊗ ·
4 · ⊗ · ·
5 ·   · ·
6 · · ⊗ · · ·
7 · · ⊗ · · · ·
8 · · ⊗ · · · · ·
9 · ·   · · · · ·
10 · · · ⊗ · · · · · ·
11 · · · ⊗ · · · · · · ·
12 · · · ⊗ · · · · · · · ·
13 · · · ⊗ · · · · · · · · ·
14 · · ·   · · · · · · · · ·
15 · · · · ⊗ · · · · · · · · ·
Theorem 4.3. a) If, for some integer k ≥ 1,
n = nk , (9)
with nk defined in (8), then players k and k+1 are weakly collusion averse, and their
Shapley value coincide;
If, instead,
nk < n < nk+1 , (10)
then, player k + 1 is the only strongly collusion averse player;
b) If n = 2 both players are simultaneously weakly collusion averse and prone, while
for n > 2 there is no collusion prone players;
c) The Shapley value is decreasing in the agent, from player 1 up to the first collusion
averse player, and is increasing in the agent from the last collusion averse player
up to player n.
Proof. When n = 2. Here Ψ = [0, 0]T and both players are simultaneously weakly
collusion prone and averse, satisfying both a) (with k = 1) and b).
When n > 2, the sign of the gap ψjj − ψj+1,j depends exclusively on the term
2n − 3j − j2. Now the quadratic function −x2 − 3x + 2n in the real variable x has a
positive root
x∗ =
−3 +√8n+ 9
2
,
so that the function is positive before the root and negative after it. The root is an
integer if and only if n = (k2 + 3k)/2 for some integer k > 1. We therefore distinguish
between two cases
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i) n = nk for some k > 1. Here x
∗ = k and the gap
ψjj − ψj+1,j is

> 0 if j < k
= 0 if j = k
< 0 if j > k
,
leading to the following sign structure for Ψ

1 2 ··· k−1 k k+1 ··· n−2 n−1
1 + + · · · + 0 − · · · − −
2 − + · · · + 0 − · · · − −
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
k−1 − − · · · + 0 − · · · − −
k − − · · · − 0 − · · · − −
k+1 − − · · · − 0 − · · · − −
k+2 − − · · · − 0 + · · · − −
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
n−1 − − · · · − 0 + · · · + −
n − − · · · − 0 + · · · + +

. (11)
Therefore players k and k + 1 (with bold typeface in the matrix) will be weakly
collusion averse, while no player will be collusion prone, since every row has at
least a “−” element. Moreover, rows k and k+1 are identical, leading to the same
Shapley value for the corresponding players.
ii) If nk < n < nk+1 for some k ≥ 1, then k < x∗ < k + 1, and the gap
ψjj − ψj+1,j is
{
> 0 if j ≤ k
< 0 if j ≥ k + 1 ,
leading to the following sign structure for Ψ

1 2 ··· k k+1 ··· n−2 n−1
1 + + · · · + − · · · − −
2 − + · · · + − · · · − −
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
k − − · · · + − · · · − −
k+1 − − · · · − − · · · − −
k+2 − − · · · − + · · · − −
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
n−1 − − · · · − + · · · + −
n − − · · · − + · · · + +

, (12)
and player k + 1 (with bold typeface in the matrix) is strongly collusion averse,
while no player will be collusion prone.
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To prove c) note that in both (11) and (12), each time we move up or down from the
rows in Ψ corresponding to collusion averse players, a “−” element is turned into “+”,
increasing the Shapley value of the corresponding player.
Remark 4.4. When n = 2 the Shapley value of both players is null, while if n = nk
for some integer k > 1, the Shapley value of all players is null if the evaluations of the
first k players coincide and those of the last n− k players coincide too.
5 Coalitions of Maximal Gain
Most often, in TU games players eventually join the grand coalition, and the Shapley
value provides a natural way for them to share its worth. The gain game that we are
considering does not share this feature, since the null worth of the grand coalition is
usually outdone by smaller coalitions that obtain a positive gain from collusion at the
expense of agents outside the coalition.
We already formulated an alternative interpretation for the Shapley value in this
context, but one question remains open: what coalition will actually prevail? We
provide an answer in terms of total or per-capita maximal gain. We will show that
these coalitions will involve only a fraction 2−1 +o (n−1) or o
(
n−1/2
)
of the population,
respectively, for the total or the per-capita maximal gain.
Definition 5.1. For any s ∈ N , we define Ss to be a coalition of cardinality s with
maximal worth among the coalitions with the same cardinality:
vg(Ss) = max
S,|S|=s
vg(S) .
Among these coalitions we will pick one with the (total) maximal gain
vg(Ss∗) = max
s∈N
vg(Ss) = max
S⊆N
vg(S) .
If we fix the number of players, a coalition yields the highest gain whenever it is
formed by Player 1 together with the last players. The following result is immediate,
and we omit its proof.
Proposition 5.2.
Ss =
{
{1} if s = 1
{1, n+ 2− s, n+ 3− s, . . . , n} otherwise .
Moreover,
v(Ss) =
n− s
n2
∑
i∈Sˆs
(v1 − vi) ,
where Sˆs = Ss \ {1} = {n+ 2− s, n+ 1− s, n− s, . . . , n}.
We now consider the difference in gain between maximal coalitions whose cardinality
differ by one unit:
∆(s) = v(Ss)− v(Ss−1) s = 2, 3, . . . , n, (13)
and give an explicit formula for it.
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Lemma 5.3. For any s = 2, 3, . . . , n,
∆(s) =
1
n2
(n− 2s+ 2)(v1 − vn+2−s)− ∑
i∈Sˆs−1
(vn+2−s − vi)
 . (14)
Proof. If s ≥ 3, then
∆(s) =
n− s
n2
∑
i∈Sˆs
(v1 − vi)− n+ 1− s
n2
∑
i∈Sˆs−1
(v1 − vi) =
1
n2
(n− s)(v1 − vn+2−s)− ∑
i∈Sˆs−1
(v1 − vi)
 =
1
n2
(n− s)(v1 − vn+2−s)− (s− 2)v1 + ∑
i∈Sˆs−1
vi + (s− 2)vn+2−s − (s− 2)vn+2−s
 =
1
n2
(n− 2s+ 2)(v1 − vn+2−s)− ∑
i∈Sˆs−1
(vn+2−s − vi)
 .
For s = 2, since v(S1) = 0,
∆(2) = v(S2)− v(S1) = v(S2) = n− 2
n2
(v1 − vn) ,
which delivers (14), once we note that Sˆ1 = ∅ and the second addend is null.
The following are straightforward consequences of the Lemma.
Proposition 5.4. i) The following holds:
v(Ss) =
{
0 if s = 1∑s
j=2 ∆(j) otherwise
; (15)
ii) ∆(s) is nonincreasing in s ;
iii) If s∗ is the largest integer such that ∆(s∗) ≥ 0 then Ss∗ will be a coalition with
total maximal gain.
Proof. Statements i) and ii) are straightforward consequences of equations (13) and
(14), respectively. To prove (5.1) note that v(Ss) is maximal when it contains the
largest number of positive increments. If we allow for null increments as well, we
obtain that s∗ is the largest integer for which v(Ss) is maximal.
Note that the following holds:
∆(2) > 0 if v1 6= vn
∆(n) < 0 if v2 6= vn ,
13
and the total maximal gain criterion suggests the following coalition formation mech-
anism, when agents know their evaluations’ ranking (but not their exact values): the
first and the last agents coalesce, then, in turn, agents n − 1, n − 2, . . . are invited to
join the coalition as long as the corresponding increment ∆ is positive, or it does not
become too small.
The per-capita gain of a coalition S ⊆ N is defined by
vpc(S) =
v(S)
|S| .
As before, the per-capita gain of a coalition with s participants is maximal with Ss,
and we consider the difference between maximal coalitions that differ by a unit:
δ(s) = vpc(Ss)− vpc(Ss−1) s = 2, 3, . . . , n,
with
vpc(Ss) =
{
0 if s = 1∑s
j=2 δ(j) otherwise
. (16)
We provide a characterization of the increment δ(s) in terms of the increments of the
(absolute) gain.
Lemma 5.5. For any s = 2, 3, . . . , n the increment δ(s) may be written as
δ(s) =

∆(2)
2
if s = 2
∆(s)−∑s−1j=2 (∆(j)−∆(s))
s(s− 1) otherwise
. (17)
Alternatively, it can be written as:
δ(s) =
(n+ s− s2) (v1 − vn+2−s)− n
∑
j∈Sˆs−1 (vn+2−s − vj)
n2s(s− 1) . (18)
Proof. First of all we prove (17). If s = 2 then
δ(2) =
v(S2)
2
− v(S1) =
∆(2)
2
.
If s ≥ 3, then
δ(s) =
v(Ss)
s
− v(Ss−1)
s− 1 =
v(Ss−1) + ∆(s)
s
− v(Ss−1)
s− 1 =
(s− 1)∆(s)− v(Ss−1)
s(s− 1) =
(s− 1)∆(s)−∑s−1j=2 ∆(j)
s(s− 1) =
∆(s)−∑s−1j=2 (∆(j)−∆(s))
s(s− 1) .
14
To prove (18), consider the following chain of equations:
δ(s) =
1
n2
n− s
s2
∑
i∈Sˆs
(v1 − vi)− n− s+ 1
s− 1
∑
j∈Sˆs−1
(v1 − vj)
 =
1
n2s(s− 1)
(n− s)(s− 1)∑
i∈Sˆs
(v1 − vi)− s(n− s+ 1)
∑
j∈Sˆs−1
(v1 − vj)
 =
1
n2s(s− 1)
(n− s)(s− 1)(v1 − vn+2−s)− n ∑
j∈Sˆs−1
(v1 − vj)
 =
(n− s)(s− 1)(v1 − vn+2−s)− n(s− 2)v1 + n
∑
j∈Sˆs−1 vj − n(s− 2)vn+2−s + n(s− 2)vn+2−s
n2s(s− 1) =
(n+ s− s2) (v1 − vn+2−s)− n
∑
j∈Sˆs−1 (vn+2−s − vj)
n2s(s− 1) .
Proposition 5.6. Suppose v1 6= vn, then there exists some index s∗∗ such that
δ(s) =
{
≥ 0 if j ≤ s∗∗
< 0 if j > s∗∗
(19)
vpc(Ss∗∗) = max
S⊆N
vpc(S) , (20)
and s∗∗ is the largest integer for which vpc(Ss) is maximal.
Proof. Clearly δ(2) > 0 when v1 6= vn. The numerator in both expressions of (17) is
decreasing in s, and it cannot be always positive, otherwise we obtain the contradiction
vpc(N) > 0. (17) is decreasing in s, and it cannot be always positive, otherwise we
obtain the contradiction vpc(N) > 0.
To prove (20) note that vpc(Ss) is maximal when it contains the largest number of
positive increments. If we allow for null increments as well, we obtain that s∗∗ is the
largest integer for which vpc(Ss) is maximal.
If the per-capita maximal worth is pursued, agents will adopt the coalition formation
procedure already described with the increment δ in place of ∆ as a measure of the
added value of each newcomer to the coalition already formed. Since, however, the
increment δ may be non-monotonic, the procedure will stop only when δ becomes
negative.
We now establish some bounds for s∗ and s∗∗.
Proposition 5.7. If v1 6= vn then
s∗∗ ≤ s∗ (21)
2 ≤ s∗ ≤
⌊n
2
+ 1
⌋
(22)
2 ≤ s∗∗ ≤ ⌈√n⌉ . (23)
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Outline of the proof. Since vpc(S1) = 0 then s
∗∗ ≥ 2. When ∆(s) < 0, then δ(s) < 0,
which implies (21).
To establish (22), consider formula (14). When s > n
2
+ 1, then, either v1 6= vn+2−s
and the first addend in (14) is strictly negative, or vn+2−s 6= vn and the second addend
in (14) is strictly negative. Either way s∗ < s, therefore s ≤ ⌊n
2
+ 1
⌋
.
In a similar fashion if s > 1+
√
1+4n
2
, then δ(s) < 0. Now 1+
√
1+4n
2
>
√
n and
1+
√
1+4n
2
−√n < 1 when n ≥ 1. Therefore s∗∗ ≤ d√ne =
⌊
1+
√
1+4n
2
⌋
.
The following examples prove that the bounds are tight for s∗.
Example 5.8. Suppose v1 = v2 = · · · = vn−1 = 1 and vn = 0. Then
v(Ss) =
0 if s = 1n− s
n2
if s ≥ 2 ,
which is maximal for s = 2. Therefore s∗ = s∗∗ = 2.
Example 5.9. Suppose n even, v1 = 0 and v2 = v3 = · · · = vn. Then,
v(Ss) =
(n− s)(s− 1)
n2
,
which is maximal for s = n
2
and s∗ = n
2
+ 1. Also, either s∗∗ = d√ne or s∗∗ = b√nc.
Remark 5.10. For some instances of the game the bounds in (22) can be made sharper.
For instance:
• If n is even, and v1 6= vn/2, then s∗ ≤ n2 ;
• If for some ` ≤ n
2
+ 1, v1 = vn+2−` and vn+2−` > vn, then s∗ < `.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we dealt with the explicit computation of the Shapley value for the gain
game introduced in Briata, Dall’Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), and its consequences to
the players’attitude towards collusion in the Knaster fair division procedure.
The Shapley value can be obtained as the matrix product among a matrix whose
entries depend only on the number of agents and the vector of the differences in the
valuations of the agents.
Further research may better formalize the coalition formation process, coupling
the players’ desire to join coalition with highest worth, together with some notion of
stability. Furthermore, we intend to compare the findings on the Shapley value of this
game with other classical game theoretical solutions, on the basis of their characterizing
properties.
Acknowledgment
The authors would like to thank Stefano Moretti for suggesting equation (25) in the
Appendix, and two anonimous referees for their constructive advices.
16
A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1
Finding an explicit expression for the Shapley value is hampered by the fact that the
marginal contribution of an agent to a coalition has a complicated espression. In fact,
if i ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ {i}, the following holds
vg(S ∪ {i})− vg(S) =
n− s− 1
n2
max
{
s(vi − bS), bS − vi
}− 1
n2
∑
k∈S
(bS − vk) . (24)
We will consider, instead, a general formula about the difference of Shapley values
for adjacent players
φj(vg)− φj+1(vg) =
∑
S⊆N\{j,j+1}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)! [vg(S ∪ {j})− vg(S ∪ {j + 1})] . (25)
The following lemma shows that the difference between the value of the coalition joined
by two successive players results in a formula much simpler than (24). For any j ∈
N \ {n}, let J = {1, . . . , j} and J c = {j + 1, . . . , n}.
Lemma A.1. For any j ∈ N \ {n} and S ⊆ N \ {j, j + 1},
vg(S ∪ {j})− vg(S ∪ {j + 1}) =
{
(n−s−1)s
n2
(vj − vj+1) if S ∩ J = ∅
−n−s−1
n2
(vj − vj+1) if S ∩ J 6= ∅
. (26)
Proof. If S ∩ J = ∅, then S ⊆ J c \ {j + 1}, and
vg(S∪{j})−vg(S∪{j+1}) = n− s− 1
n2
 ∑
i∈S∪{j}
(
bS∪{j} − vi
)− ∑
i∈S∪{j+1}
(
bS∪{j+1} − vi
) =
n− s− 1
n2
(∑
i∈S
(vj − vi)−
∑
i∈S
(vj+1 − vi)
)
=
n− s− 1
n2
s(vj − vj+1) .
Otherwise, S ∩ J 6= ∅, and
vg(S ∪ {j})− vg(S ∪ {j + 1}) = n− s− 1
n2
 ∑
i∈S∪{j}
(bS − vi)−
∑
i∈S∪{j+1}
(bS − vi)
 =
− n− s− 1
n2
(vj − vj+1) .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Each coalition worth in the gain game can be written as
vg(S) =
n− s
n2
∑
i∈S
(bS − vi) =
n−1∑
j=1
cS,j (vj − vj+1) , (27)
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where
cS,j =
n− s
n2
∑
i∈S
IS,i(j) , IS,i(j) =
{
1 if minh∈S h ≤ j < i
0 otherwise
,
and the coefficients cS,j do not depend on the actual values of the vi’s (within a fixed
ranking). The Shapley value for a player is a linear combination of differences of
coalitions’ worths, and therefore a linear combination of the differences in valuations
between successive agents, explaining (2).
The gain game is such that vg(N) = 0 and, therefore,
0 = vg(N) =
n∑
i=1
φi(vg) =
n∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
ψij(vj − vj+1) =
n−1∑
j=1
(vj − vj+1)
n∑
i=1
ψij .
Since this holds for any choice of the vi, i ∈ N , it must be that
n∑
i=1
ψij = 0 for any j ∈ N \ {n}. (28)
In order to have a simple expression for the coefficients ψij we introduce a particular
set of evaluation for the agents, and then we consider the related gain game. For any
j ∈ N \ {n}, let the evaluations be as follows:
vh =
{
1 if h ∈ J
0 if h ∈ J c . (29)
Let vg,j be the corresponding gain game. Clearly, from (2) we have:
φi(vg,j) = ψij for any i, j ∈ N.
Moreover, by the symmetry1 of the players in J and in J c, and recalling that the
Shapley value assigns equal amounts to symmetric players we have
ψ1j = ψ2j = · · · = ψjj = aj (30)
ψj+1,j = ψj+2,j = · · · = ψnj = bj .
To compute every ψij we only need to determine the differences between ψjj and ψj+1,j,
which we can write as:
ψjj − ψj+1,j = aj − bj = φj(vg,j)− φj+1(vg,j) . (31)
We now apply (25), together with Lemma (A.1). Noting that vj−vj+1 = 1 in the game
vgj, the Lemma distinguishes between two cases:
Case 1 : S ∩ J = ∅ and, therefore, S ⊆ J c \ {j + 1}. The part of formula (25)
pertaining these coalitions is present only when j ∈ N \ {n− 1, n} and it is given
1Two players i, j ∈ N are called symmetric if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
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by ∑
S⊆Jc\{j+1}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)! (vg(S ∪ {j})− vg(S ∪ {j + 1})) =∑
S⊆Jc\{j+1}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
(n− s− 1)s
n2
=
1
n2
∑
S⊆Jc\{j+1}
s!(n− s− 2)!(n− s− 1)
(n− 1)! s =
1
n2
∑
S⊆Jc\{j+1}
1(
n−1
s
)s = 1
n2
n−j−1∑
s=1
(
n−j−1
s
)(
n−1
s
) s .
Case 2 S ∩ J 6= ∅. The part of formula (25) pertaining this case is given by∑
S∩J 6=∅,S⊆N\{j,j+1}
− s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
n− s− 1
n2
=
= − 1
n2
∑
S∩J 6=∅,S⊆N\{j,j+1}
s!(n− s− 1)!
(n− 1)! = −
1
n2
∑
S∩J 6=∅,S⊆N\{j,j+1}
1(
n−1
s
) .
Now, we can choose a set of s units, with at least 1 unit from the first j − 1 in a
number of ways given by
min{j−1,s}∑
t=max{1,s+j+1−n}
(
j − 1
t
)(
n− j − 1
s− t
)
=

(
n−2
s
)− (n−j−1
s
)
if s ≤ n− j − 1
(
n−2
s
)
if s > n− j − 1
.
Therefore, the part of (25) pertaining this case becomes
− 1
n2
n−2∑
s=1
[# of ways]
1(
n−1
s
) =

− 1
n2
n−2∑
s=1
(n−2s )
(n−1s )
if j = n− 1
− 1
n2
n−2∑
s=1
(n−2s )
(n−1s )
+ 1
n2
n−j−1∑
s=1
(n−j−1s )
(n−1s )
if j < n− 1
.
Joining the results for Case 1 and Case 2 when j < n− 1, we have
ψjj − ψj+1,j = 1
n2
[
n−j−1∑
s=1
(
n−j−1
s
)(
n−1
s
) s− n−2∑
s=1
(
n−2
s
)(
n−1
s
) + n−j−1∑
s=1
(
n−j−1
s
)(
n−1
s
) ] . (32)
Applying Lemma 3.3 to the r.h.s. of (32), it is easy to check that
ψjj − ψj+1,j = 1
n2
[
n (n− j − 1)
(j + 1) (j + 2)
− n− 2
2
+
n− j − 1
j + 1
]
=
2n− 3j − j2
2n(j + 1)(j + 2)
. (33)
To prove (3), we recall (28), (30) and solve the following system of linear equations in
the variables aj and bj {
jaj + (n− j)bj = 0
aj − bj = 2n−3j−j22n(j+1)(j+2)
.
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